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Within the energy geographies debate on the uneven scalar effects of energy transitions, this
article addresses the under-examined, increasing intersection of automation and energy
transitions. Using a comparative case of national smart meter rollouts—the deployment of
distributed energy monitors whose diffusion constitutes the foundation for layering and
automating energy infrastructure—it draws on two contrasting studies. One features an
urban living lab during Norway’s rapidly completed smart meter rollout to 2.9 million con-
sumers; the other targets the national scale in Portugal during its recently accelerated two-
fifths completed smart meter rollout across six million consumers. The article identifies twin
scalar biases: (i) social aspects of automation are controlled at higher scales while users are
responsibilised for them at the household scale, and (ii) both control over and responsibility
for technical aspects are restricted to higher scales. It empirically specifies how these scalar
biases modulate socio-technical infrastructural interventions, such as smart meters. On this
basis, it argues that embedding social and technical differentiation due to such scalar biases
risks dehumanising technical aspects while detechnicising social aspects in this early inter-
section of energy transitions and automation.
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Uneven scalar effects at the conjuncture of automation and
energy transitions
Energy transitions—here defined as socio-material shifts inenergy systems—have uneven effects across scales. Actorsnegotiate the process and impact of transitioning socio-
technical infrastructures through a maze of institutional and
relational factors (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014; Becker et al.,
2016). Scholarship has established that these factors modulate
how socio-technical interventions impact energy users, how
equitable the energy sector is, and whether and how low-carbon
energy transitions take place (Wolsink, 2012). The article argues
that the uneven scalar effects of this modulation (Raven et al.,
2012; Broto and Baker, 2018) are amplified at the conjuncture of
energy transitions and forms of automation, such as smart
meters, digitalisation and consumer access devices, and markets
for energy flexibility. It finds that actors at lower scales (thinly
distributed and at low hierarchies in the energy sector decision-
making apparatus), such as solar prosuming households and
energy communities, tend to be responsibilised for social aspects,
but do not control them (cf. Larson and Ribot, 2004; Britton,
2019). Actors at higher scales (concentrated in urban conglom-
erations and proximate to the nerve centres that control energy
sectors), such as regional utilities and traders on national energy
markets, tend to be attributed technical expertise and professio-
nalise around automation. Thus, this emerging trend at the
intersection of energy transitions and automation risks dehu-
manising technical aspects and addressing them at higher scales,
while detechnicising social aspects and placing them at lower
scales.
This study defines, compares and contrasts uneven scalar
effects through two cases of automation under energy transitions,
namely smart meter rollout in Norway and Portugal. While smart
electric meters in themselves are energy-monitoring devices, the
deployment and diffusion of this distributed infrastructure at the
household scale constitutes the foundation for layering and
automating energy infrastructure by enabling crucial real-time
digital data flows (Silvast et al., 2018). It is also thus far the part of
the energy sector where digitalisation and automation have made
the most empirically observable advances. This makes it a suitable
focus for the research question: what scalar biases characterise the
automation of socio-technical energy infrastructure?
In Norway, findings are based on an 18-month living lab, a
real-world urban laboratory for experimentation characterised by
“situatedness, change-orientation and contingency” (Karvonen
and Van Heur, 2014, p. 379). This living lab featured 46 house-
hold sub-meter monitors that enabled users to monitor real-time
household electricity consumption down to the device level, albeit
patchily. It ran in parallel with Norway achieving near-universal
smart meter coverage for three million consumer households,
from 18 percent in January 2017 to 97 percent or 2.9 million
smart meters in January 2019. It thus explored change-
orientation during a time of contingency in a situated manner,
centred on perspectives of household users as the targets of smart
meter rollout. In Portugal, findings focus on the national scale,
tracing during 2017–2019 how smart meter rollout was modu-
lated through a top-down process (Coutinho et al., 2017) to two-
fifths of six million consumer households (2.4 million by Sep-
tember 2019). In addition, these findings reflect on the relevance
of uncertainties related to distribution grid concessions, based on
5 months of fieldwork in Portugal. The first case unpacks how
people comprehend the emergent technical possibilities of smart
grids, but face intractable barriers to routinise individual and
social engagement in shaping Norway’s energy transition impacts
at the local scale (Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019). The second case
illustrates how the rollout of smart meters is justified in a way that
has little to do with their actual social use (Gouveia and Seixas,
2016), and rather depends on technical legitimation strategies
that do not fully apprehend its impacts on the Portuguese energy
transition.
On this twin basis, the article studies multi-scalar modulation
to identify the scalar biases of automation during energy transi-
tions. At the household scale, it appears that users tend to be
responsibilised for individual behavioural change even though
this presents only nominal gains in energy efficiency. At the grid
scale, it seems that incumbent utilities tend to control technical
change and set terms that favour them over energy users on
matters like distribution grid concessions and installing solar
capacity. The article argues that such biases lower people’s agency
to envision and enact post-automation energy futures. Uneven
scalar effects place responsibilities on these users to conform to a
particular mode of sectoral evolution that maintains control in
the hands of supply-side actors. Emerging configurations during
smart meter rollout indicate that the main role played by actors at
lower scales—such as household users—is to be responsible for
some social aspects of this basic step in automation. In contrast,
overall control and responsibility is largely retained by actors at
higher scales, such as regulators and national and regional uti-
lities. Empirically identifying scalar biases during transitions to
automated energy infrastructure—using the emerging example of
smart meters—improves our understanding of how such socio-
technical interventions are modulated in contrasting yet com-
parable Norwegian and Portuguese cases.
The article is structured in the following order. The next sec-
tion, “Energy geographies of infrastructure transition: the scalar
unevenness of automation”, presents a brief literature review that
connects the concept of scale, within the field of energy geo-
graphies, with scholarship on smart energy infrastructure and
automation. This is followed by the section “Scales of control and
responsibility in socio-technical automation”, which elaborates
the role of control and responsibility in the automation of a socio-
technical sector such as electricity, defines these key concepts, and
proposes an analytical framework for the article. Thereafter, the
section “Methodology and background: case selection and data”
explains the basis for case selection and data collection. It pro-
vides basic background details for the two contrasting cases,
including the household electricity infrastructure context, the
smart meter rollout trajectories in Norway and Portugal, and the
data sources used.
Next, an empirically informed section “Findings and analysis:
scales of control and responsibility” briefly analyses the two cases
of socio-technical automation. It argues that lower scale actors—
users—are excluded from both control and responsibility for
technical aspects, and that the automation of energy infra-
structure is primarily treated as a technical matter for experts at
hierarchies above the household scale. This provides the basis for
the conclusion. The final section, “Embedding social and tech-
nical differentiation in the automation of energy infrastructure”,
discusses the scalar unevenness of automation in terms of where
control over and responsibility for the social and technical aspects
of automation are located in each case. It is concluded that these
scalar biases limit the social imaginaries of what smart meter
rollouts can and do enable in terms of smart electric grids of the
future.
Energy geographies of infrastructure transition: the scalar
unevenness of automation
In recent years, energy geographies has emerged as a distinct field
of scholarship that analyses how geographies determine societies’
interactions with their energy systems (Huber, 2015). This field is
responsive to the pressing concern of an urgent transition to low-
carbon energy systems. Such a transition can mitigate the worst
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effects of runaway climate change by lowering this component of
greenhouse gas emissions. As a discipline, geography is equipped
to theorise the scalar unevenness of energy transitions, which play
out in socio-material geographies that are often characterised by
the spatial concentration of power and control over energy sys-
tems in urban centres, close to where political power is also held
(Broto and Baker, 2018; also see Evans et al., 2019). The field
seeks to direct attention to the socio-spatially marginalised areas
and populations who are most vulnerable to and least able to
influence energy transitions as they unfold. It combines attention
to issues of structure and agency at and across multiple scales,
both horizontal (spatial) and vertical (hierarchies of power), with
an appreciation of the socio-materiality of energy infrastructure
itself (Bulkeley et al., 2016; Sareen and Haarstad, 2018).
Increasingly, one of the main ways in which scholars, policy-
makers, planners and practitioners discuss the socio-materiality
of low-carbon energy transitions is in terms of increasing auto-
mation (Adil and Ko, 2016; Lund et al., 2017). Smart city debates
address energy sector automation at the urban scale (Luque-Ayala
and Marvin, 2019; Britton, 2019), and regional debates are con-
cerned with its implications for network infrastructure (Hall and
Foxon, 2014). Spatiotemporal concerns around energy flexibility
are rife in technical scholarship (Lund et al., 2017); business
models are evolving to capitalise on the opportunity posed by cost
declines in energy storage and renewable energy sources through
new algorithms and energy data infrastructures for dynamic
pricing (Hashem et al., 2016). A question arises whether these
changes will reconfigure prevalent energy supply logics (Eid et al.,
2016). Nowhere is this more keenly relevant than in societal
debates about smart meters, which have excited interest and
proved contentious (Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019; Stephens
et al., 2013). Analysing smart meter rollouts can thus serve as a
window onto the politics and governance of urban experi-
mentation (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Hodson and Marvin, 2015).
There have been recent efforts to do so through urban living lab
approaches (e.g., McLean et al., 2016), as well as comparative
analyses of contrasting rollouts at national scales (e.g., Silvast
et al., 2018).
A smart meter is a specific data infrastructure that comes with
the promise of improved monitoring and greater energy flexibility
on the electric grid (Hledik, 2009). The past decade has seen
increasing interest in such promises, and many countries, notably
in Europe but also others such as the USA and China, have
commenced smart meter rollout at the national scale. Some such
programmes are even close to completion, one example being
Norway. Household users (whom this article is concerned with)
have been the main focus of such rollout programmes, since
larger users have typically already had smart meters installed. As
a socio-technical intervention, the rollout has involved installing
new devices in every household at the point where the electric
grid delivers electricity to the household. The capabilities of the
new, so-called smart meters vary across and even within countries
—as a general minimum, a digital screen displays the total
amount of energy consumption in kilo watt hours (kwh), with
additional functionalities all the way to enabling users to access
their real-time electricity consumption via smartphone applica-
tions (Benzi et al., 2011). Suppliers also gain access to these data,
with one of the common justifications of such rollouts being that
this enables suppliers and distribution service operators (DSOs)
to manage energy supply more efficiently (Erlinghagen et al.,
2015). The granular monitoring of real-time consumption can
also facilitate the creation of new value streams, including
demand-side flexibility and Internet-of-Things functionalities (cf.
Stojkoska and Trivodaliev, 2017). Questions abound, such as
whether the benefits of prospective efficiency gains will be shared
with users, and whether smart meters can enable sophisticated
future demand response (Schick and Gad, 2015; Saele and
Grande, 2011)—i.e., the management of user demand to help
electric utilities balance the load on the grid, which has tradi-
tionally been done by adjusting electric supply rather than
demand.
Thus, despite smart meters being energy infrastructure that is
put in place at the household scale, their effect as a socio-technical
intervention that builds automation into transitioning energy
sectors spans multiple scales (Wolsink, 2012; Britton, 2019).
While smart meters specifically automate data collection, this
constitutes a foundational step to enable the remote and real-time
control of energy demand and appliances (cf. Silvast et al., 2018).
Future flexibility business models can build on this infrastructure
to use data and controls through consumer access devices (e.g.,
smartphone applications, cf. Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019) and
emerging Internet-of-Things devices (cf. Alaa et al., 2017).
Uneven scalar effects may come into play with regard to spatial
considerations of how the digitalisation and monitoring of real-
time distributed and disaggregated consumption data affects
energy sector stakeholders, and in terms of how households,
suppliers and utilities are positioned along vertical scales or
hierarchies of decision-making to access and act upon these data
infrastructures and flows (Bulkeley et al., 2016; Schick and Gad,
2015; Sareen et al., 2020). It is clear, then, that smart meter
rollouts constitute interventions that act upon the ontology of
existing energy sectors and build automation into infrastructure.
Despite this recognition, smart meter rollouts have only begun
to be analysed in these terms in emergent, empirical energy
geographies scholarship and across multiple scales. This timely
research need deserves to be more fully addressed, precisely
because of the insights from energy geographies on the sig-
nificance of uneven scalar effects. The modalities of building
automation into the socio-materiality of critical energy infra-
structures have consequences for how user-centric and demo-
cratic an energy future such infrastructures enable (Stephens
et al., 2013; Szulecki, 2018). To analyse automation in socio-
technical transitions, this article unpacks the impact of uneven
scalar effects—or in other words, scalar biases—during smart
meter rollout.
Scales of control and responsibility in socio-technical
automation
Energy infrastructure is socio-technical in nature. Energy use is
inherently social, as it is deeply embedded into social practices
and behaviours shaped and conditioned by interactions with
evolving energy infrastructure over time (Shove et al., 2015;
Schivelbusch, 1995). Energy infrastructure is also deeply techni-
cal, as its design and management requires expert handling of the
complexities of balancing shifting patterns of energy supply and
demand over time and space. The average household user of an
electric grid lacks a detailed understanding of technical aspects of
energy infrastructure, while embodying a specific everyday social
relationship with this infrastructure (Sareen and Rommetveit,
2019). Any society features a range of such everyday relation-
ships, which can be categorised along lines such as a household’s
ability to afford electricity; residential buildings typologies and
their energy needs; house ownership and consequent control over
energy and other infrastructure; and intra-household power
dynamics among inhabitants (Gouveia and Seixas, 2016; Gross-
mann, 2019). Most utility workers who have a detailed under-
standing of the technical aspects of an electric grid lack insight
into the variety of everyday relationships users have with it (Naus
et al., 2014; Katzeff and Wangel, 2015). Their assumptions about
the way households use electric infrastructure are plausibly
founded on their own experience with it as users, combined with
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stories from media reports, from their friends and colleagues, and
from grey literature on the sector (Ballo, 2015; Skjølsvold et al.,
2015). There is thus a broad clustering of insights: on the social
aspects of this socio-technical infrastructure at the household
scale, and its technical aspects at the utility scale.
It follows from the above that, as a socio-technical intervention
that seeks to build automation into electric grids, the rollout of
smart meters takes place in a field that exhibits uneven scalar
effects. Utilities are more knowledgeable about technical aspects
whereas households are better versed with social aspects of
electric grids as an everyday infrastructure. Thus, smart meter
rollout can be construed in terms of control over and responsi-
bility for each of its aspects, the social and technical. Who has
control over each aspect, and who is responsible for it? At what
scales are control and responsibility exercised? This is depicted as
a 2 × 2 matrix in Table 1.
This matrix provides the analytical approach deployed to
analyse two cases in this article. The term ‘control’ is defined in
relation to extensive debates in science and technology studies
(STS) scholarship. On the one hand, components of energy sys-
tems can be controlled (usually centrally), whereas components
outside energy systems comprise the general environment and
cannot be controlled (Hughes, 1983; Rohracher, 2008). On the
other hand, energy infrastructure can be regarded as webs where
control is more spatially distributed and exercised through net-
works of relations (Edwards, 2010; Silvast et al., 2013). In this
article, control refers to the ability to exercise power in favour of a
particular configuration of energy infrastructure and its effect on
the overall energy system. The term ‘responsibility’ is defined in
relation to political ecology scholarship on decentralised gov-
ernance and accountability (Larson and Ribot, 2004; Agrawal and
Ribot, 1999). It refers to obligations by actors who are held
accountable for a certain object, such as a process or infra-
structure: in this case the smart meter. As these scholars of
governance and power have established, responsibility is not
always accompanied by power (which is associated with control,
as defined above), but the relations of responsibility that are
established confer legitimacy to the exercise of power in a par-
ticular configuration by specific actors. Thus, control and
responsibility provide an analytical framework to identify how
power is exercised, by whom and at what scales.
The next section describes the case selection and data collec-
tion. It also provides background details for both cases. Based on
empirical findings for the smart meter rollout cases in Norway
and Portugal, the section “Findings and analysis: scales of control
and responsibility” argues that specific, similar patterns are dis-
cernible in both interventions. The conclusion operationalises
the analytical framework explicated above. It abstracts out from
this analysis to discuss socio-technical differentiation in the
embedment of scalar biases during the emergence of automation
of energy infrastructure. It concludes by reflecting on the
implications for larger energy sector transitions, in terms of the
conditions such scalar biases and socio-technical differentiation
may bring into place for electric grids of the future.
Methodology and background: case selection and data
The smart meter rollouts in Norway and Portugal have been
selected to maximise difference (Lijphart, 1975). They are
different in at least three ways: empirical data sources and their
scalar locations used for this article; household electricity infra-
structure context; and the trajectory and degree of each rollout.
This provides a rich comparative dataset combined in a manner
that the qualitative research community in energy social science is
pushing for (cf. Middlemiss et al., 2020).
Empirical data sources and their scalar locations. For Norway,
this article draws on empirical data from an urban living lab on
smart grids, as part of the PARticipatory platform for sustainable
ENergy managemenT (PARENT) project (see https://www.
parent-project.eu). This ran for 18 months during 2017–2019
with 46 purposively sampled households in Bergen in parallel
with smart meter rollout, with a focus on social imaginaries of
this infrastructural change. Using a sub-meter monitor in each
household to simulate a sophisticated smart meter, the living lab
generated real-time device-level electricity usage data (Sareen and
Rommetveit, 2019). This was available to living lab participants
and project staff. Data collection was accompanied by monthly
newsletters on energy behaviour and an online (web browser and
smartphone application based) platform for users to track their
real-time usage, patterns over time, and to compare usage with
similar-sized households. Methods included iterative meetings for
three rounds of focus group discussions; a few individual inter-
views; surveys at the beginning and end of the living lab; and a
workshop with the living lab participants where the sub-meter
monitor was physically deconstructed as a basis for discussion.
This empirical material provides a basis to understand household
behaviour and perceptions, including participants’ reflections on
the political economy and socio-technical aspects of smart meters.
The author was part of the project team that ran the urban living
lab. As these results have been reported in greater detail elsewhere
(cf. Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019), this article summarises key
findings drawn from the extensive data in relation to the scalar
aspects of automating socio-technical infrastructure.
For Portugal, the article draws on a subset of data from 80
interviews with energy sector experts, as well as field observations
at energy sector meetings and projects conducted by the author
for 5 months during 2017–2019. These ethnographic data
collection techniques were mainly focused on energy transitions
in relation to solar energy uptake at multiple scales (cf. Sareen
and Haarstad, 2018; Sareen, 2020), with smart meters studied as a
cognate concern. As the interviews were in-depth (50–150 min)
and semi-structured, the close links between smart meters and
solar PV rollout (cf. Pereira et al., 2018) meant that smart meters
were referred to frequently. Smart meters were discussed with
over 20 experts in 15 of these interviews, complemented by site
visits to smart meter pilot projects, including the flagship EDP
Inovgrid project. In contrast to Norway, the methods in Portugal
generated insights at the national and sub-national scale, e.g., in
the Evora township where EDP ran the pilot project Inovgrid
with over 30,000 households. Interviewees included representa-
tives from: the DSO EDP which is also an energy supplier, the
national electricity regulator, the national executive authority for
energy, energy consultants, regional sectoral researchers, an
energy cooperative, journalists, investors, regional agencies, and
municipalities of various sizes, including the national capital
Lisbon.
Table 1 Control and responsibility in a multi-scalar socio-technical transition.
Social aspects Technical aspects
Control Which user and at what scale? Which user and at what scale?
Responsibility Which user and at what scale? Which user and at what scale?
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Household electricity infrastructure context. Norwegian elec-
tricity is largely sourced from hydropower, which dominates
domestic electricity production, supplemented by a little wind
energy in the grid mix. In 2018, hydropower was 95 percent and
wind 3 percent of the Norwegian electricity source mix, leaving a
minimal role for fossil fuel sources (IEA, 2019). The materiality of
hydropower makes energy generation distant from most elec-
tricity users, and offers grid flexibility due to Norway’s landscape,
which lends itself to reverse hydro pumping as an energy storage
technology (Hagos et al., 2014). Given this plentiful and relatively
clean electricity source, households in Norway power much of
their household energy needs with electricity, including typical
electric appliances (lighting, white goods like washing machines
and dishwashers), electric stoves and ovens for cooking, electric
water and space heating (Nesbakken, 1999), and most recently
rapid growth in electric vehicle charging. Electricity consumption
expenditure constitutes a relatively small share of household
disposable income, and while there is little by way of data on
energy poverty for Norway, this lack of data despite a generally
sophisticated national statistics system itself symbolises the rela-
tive abundance of household electricity access and affordability.
Portugal is one of the leading European countries on renewable
energy sources for electricity. In 2018, 52 percent of its grid mix
was supplied by hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal, biofuels
and biomass energy sources; fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas
make up an increasingly smaller portion (Gouveia et al., 2014;
IEA, 2019). This currently enables it to balance the grid relatively
easily, but with an envisaged increase in renewable energy
penetration to transition to fully renewable electricity sources by
2030, energy flexibility is a current concern. Households rely on
electricity mainly for lighting and some for white goods, whereas
cooking is often powered by gas. Space heating is based on a
variety of sources including electricity to a very limited extent,
while water heating is often solar thermal due to high irradiation
rates, or electric. The country has one of Europe’s highest energy
poverty rates (Gouveia and Seixas, 2016), and features a growing
focus on alleviating this through measures, such as a social
electricity tariff for energy poor households (Horta et al., 2019).
Users are generally conscious of their electricity bills as this
constitutes a significant expense compared to household income,
and the use of electricity is spartan compared to Norway
(cf. Horta et al., 2019; Mills and Schleich, 2012).
Trajectory and degree of rollout. Norway’s smart meter rollout
to 2.9 million out of three million consumers was decided upon in
2011, despite a negative result from an initial cost benefit analysis
(Ballo, 2015), with the completion deadline postponed from 2017
to 2019 in 2013. It is an example of close government–industry
coordination, where industrial actors undertook early research
and development and held a close dialogue with the national
regulator to agree upon a supply-side process and timeline
(Inderberg, 2015). Deployment stood at 18 percent by the end of
2016, and 2 years later, reached 97 percent nationwide, at about
10 percent below the initial cost estimate, and costing about €300
per smart meter (based on official data displayed on
www.nymaler.no as of 13.03.2020). It was executed by over 130
DSOs (some have since been consolidated, but as of 2020 Norway
had over 120 DSOs), and followed a mandatory model with
limited opt-out possibilities and hefty penalties (exceeding €200)
for dissenting users. This makes it one of the fastest and
smoothest rollouts for any national programme. But it was not
altogether free of controversy, with 0.3 percent of users refusing
to allow utilities physical access to install smart meters, or
acquiring medical certificates to exempt themselves on grounds of
health concerns, as evident with the formation of organisations,
such as http://stoppsmartmaalerne.no (literally Stop Smart
Meters) and Facebook protest groups with thousands of
members.
By contrast, Portugal began its smart meter rollout with an
urban-scale pilot across more than 30,000 households in the town
of Evora in 2009. This was in place relatively early, with
monitoring of household energy savings (for details, see
Guerreiro et al., 2015). The utility, Energais de Portugal (EDP),
established a demonstration facility called Inovgrid to showcase
the potential benefits of smart grids as a flagship case in Europe.
By 2015, EDP had deployed over 100,000 smart meters,
replicating its Inovgrid experience at six other sites. Unlike
Norway with over 120 DSOs, the incumbent DSO EDP
dominates mainland electricity distribution in Portugal. The
national regulator incentivised rollout by providing a premium
rate of return for investments in energy efficiency-enhancing
infrastructure (including smart meters), but did not allow the
DSO to recover costs directly from users. Due to an initially
inconclusive cost–benefit analysis in 2012, and despite a positive
one in 2015, the regulator did not establish a national target.
Despite this, deployment began to accelerate during 2017, when
600,000 smart meters were installed. Total deployment reached
25 percent by the end of 2018, then exceeded 40 percent with 2.5
million smart meters installed by September 2019, as per media
reports. More precise figures were not available due to the lack of
official reporting requirements or a national programme. While
users had a right to access their data, the smart meters were
owned (unlike in Norway) by the DSO.
Findings and analysis: scales of control and responsibility
The analytical framework was applied to these contrasting cases
in order to examine the scalar biases that characterise the auto-
mation of socio-technical energy infrastructure in each of them.
Norway. Living lab participants encountered a number of pro-
blems during all stages of the rollout, which simulated actual
smart meter deployment. Problems began with the installation,
when different legacy infrastructures (the type of existing elec-
tricity meter and switchboard and its physical location within or
outside the residential building) modulated how smooth or
frustrating participants found the process. Problems extended to
the lack of ease participants experienced in using the smartphone
application to access their real-time electricity usage data. The
algorithm used by the sub-meter monitor was clunky in being
able to pick up some devices; for instance, electric stoves (where
each intensity setting pulls different amounts of electricity)
showed up as many individual devices. While some participants
found it interesting to track their electricity usage patterns (daily
peaks and troughs, daily demand curves over the months), others
reported that their interest dwindled quickly and they did not
engage regularly with the smartphone application or an inter-
active online platform (which was gamified to compare their
consumption with similar households).
Beyond these practical traits, participants reported numerous
concerns: some did not feel they could trust the energy companies
with data on their electricity usage; others felt Norway’s
investments for energy flexibility were only helping other
countries (for instance to reduce Germany’s dependence on coal)
while burdening Norwegian taxpayers. Participants’ keenness and
ability to reduce their own electricity consumption based on the
smart meter simulation varied, but they shared a common sense
of disenfranchisement—they were not able to influence the way
smart meters were being rolled out or what it meant for their
energy future or how their data were used or abused (also see
Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019). These participants were all
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purposively sampled based on their interest in the energy sector
and, being part of a technologically sophisticated pilot, many were
tech savvy and knowledgeable, and some were early adopters of
solar panels and electric vehicles, so such a sentiment coming
from them is notable. If these relatively informed and affluent
households felt marginalised in decision-making on the mod-
alities of smart meter rollout and what it meant for household
energy futures, what scope is there to secure the concerns of the
average person?
Alongside the living lab, the smart meter rollout was completed
in Norway, with over 97 percent coverage by January 2019. By
February 2020, the national platform Elhub was operational. This
enabled continuous exchange of real-time energy usage data
among validated actors registered on Elhub, thus providing a
basis for supply-side energy efficiency gains and further
automation, including Internet-of-Things applications for
demand-side flexibility. It remained to be seen to what extent
future automation innovation, driven by supply-side interests,
would benefit users.
Portugal. Respondents in Portugal saw smart meter rollout as a
deeply contingent process. Energy researchers pointed out that
public perception that smart meters would increase costs made
rollout difficult for the DSO, which had to invest in deploying this
infrastructure. For the DSO, EDP, smart meters were an impor-
tant technical addition to the low voltage distribution network,
which would improve detailed data flow and analysis. The
Inovgrid pilot project made it clear that there were supply-side
advantages. But without regulatory permission to gradually
recover most rollout costs via fixed charge components of con-
sumers’ electricity bills, the rapid progress of the rollout was
uncertain even to sectoral actors. An EDP representative found
various regulatory limits frustrating, as the DSO could not install
customised infrastructure at the transformer (household cluster)
scale, which could have opened up scope for greater supply-side
flexibility and gains in efficiency. A regulatory representative
explained the necessity of imposing this limit. This was namely to
avoid favouring a particular utility, as the distribution grid license
was given to the DSO for a fixed period by the 308 municipalities
in Portugal, which hold the right to distribute electricity within
their territory.
While EDP had been given this right during the liberalisation
of Portugal’s electricity sector in the mid-2000s, it was up for
renewal. During 2018 and 2019, the design of the concessions for
the distribution grid was the subject of technical discussions, and
also of parliamentary debates. The latter revolved around the
basis on which to value this infrastructure, given the uncertain-
ties that surrounded how smart electric grids would be used in
coming decades. The ability to control electric flows would
increase in value, due to the need for greater energy flexibility as
low-carbon energy sources would grow and sectors like transport
would be electrified. A respondent with technical insight into the
electricity sector in Portugal mused that control over the
distribution grid infrastructure was a ‘cash cow’ for the DSO.
Yet the DSO was one of the expert entities who provided inputs
to the regulator’s decision on how to design the distribution grid
concessions: as a small number of large municipal groups. EDP
representatives saw this as natural, since they were best
positioned to give such technical inputs. But a Ministry of
Environment and Energy Transition, formed in October 2018,
wanted a clearer process, and delayed grid concessions until
2020. This prolonged the uncertainty of long-term grid control
for the DSO, which nonetheless proceeded to deploy smart
meters, ostensibly expecting to be able to win licences in most if
not all of Portugal.
A consultant with long-term knowledge of national regulation
mused that, despite months of debates, public and sectoral
discussions had not dealt with smart grids at all. At a June 2019
national meeting, a researcher pointed to other countries’
experiences with distribution grid concessions to suggest that a
far larger number of territories with many companies competing
over the DSO licences in a regulated monopoly at the regional
scale would be favourable for Portugal, citing Sweden and
Norway as examples. These charged events at the national scale
showed concern about the technical uncertainties and the
necessity of establishing a value for distribution grid infrastruc-
ture in line with an evolving understanding of energy flexibility.
But there was no mention of social aspects of smart meter rollout
as a socio-technical intervention. By 2020, EDP had launched its
‘EDP re:dy box’. This promoted smart meters with accessories
that consumers could buy to enable Internet-of-Things functions
such as remote control of home energy devices, creating new
value streams that EDP was well positioned to benefit from.
Smart meters were thus successfully branded as a centrally
delivered technical innovation rather than a potential game-
changer for the dynamics of control over energy infrastructure
due to automation.
Embedding social and technical differentiation in the
automation of energy infrastructure
The contrast in focus at the household scale and the national scale
is revelatory. It is summarised in Table 2. Empirical material on
Norway was focused on the household scale, but literature was
also available about the national scale. Empirical material on
Portugal was collected at the national scale, but conveyed clear
indications of prospects for the household scale as the rollout
progressed. Despite various contrasts between the two cases, they
show remarkable similarity: control for both social and technical
aspects rests predominantly at the national scale; responsibility
for social aspects is placed at the household scale; and responsi-
bility for technical aspects remains at the national scale.
To discuss this based on the analysis above: living lab parti-
cipants in Norway felt responsibilised to manage the social
aspects of smart meters themselves (or at least of the simulator,
which closely mirrored such an intervention almost simultaneous
to the actual rollout). The complexity of these social aspects was
poorly represented in the national discussion, which only incor-
porated debate on health and privacy concerns to a limited extent,
even as households were forced to accept the intervention (Ballo,
2015; Inderberg, 2015). In Portugal, social aspects were essentially
missing from the debate, which remained limited to technical
matters and largely outside the public eye, since the rollout was
not mandatory and the DSO absorbed the costs. Yet households
were forced to accept infrastructural automation wherever the
DSO chose to roll it out. By contrast, control over how to roll out
smart meters, what characteristics to mandate, and how they
should interface with energy use, remained firmly at the national
scale in both countries. Household participants felt excluded from
any real influence on this in Norway (Sareen and Rommetveit,
2019), whereas in Portugal, control remained with experts; it was
not regarded as part of a broader social concern.
Table 2 Control and responsibility in smart meter rollouts in
Norway and Portugal.
Social aspects Technical aspects
Control National scale National scale
Responsibility Household scale National scale
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In both countries, control over technical aspects was main-
tained at the national scale, without any representation from the
household scale. Technical aspects were moreover seen as the
responsibility of national scale actors—they were dealt with in a
centralised manner, by regulators, ministries and large utilities
(in Norway, this included the industry association Energy Nor-
way, cf. Inderberg, 2015), rather than with a role for actors at
disaggregated scales to participate in and shape discussions and
regulations. While this is understandable for complex technical
parts of large infrastructure systems, smart meters are at the
supply–demand interface and an example of energy infra-
structure that households can and do interact with. Thus, this
exclusion of lower scales from both control and responsibility for
technical aspects limits the social imaginaries of what smart
meter rollout can and does enable in terms of smart grids of the
future.
The findings and analysis above, when fitted into Table 2,
surface an uneasy relationship between automation in socio-
technical transitions and the uneven scalar effects of energy
geographies. Despite being contrasting socio-economic contexts
in which electric grids serve distinct needs, and despite featuring
smart meter rollout programmes that have been designed and
fared in different ways, Norway and Portugal have a lot in
common when it comes to the user-centric and democratic
nature of their smart meter rollouts, or lack thereof. It seems fair
to say that there is a prevalent view in both countries that favours
smart meters rollout, so this article does not intend to challenge
that choice. But in representative democracy, the question of how
to do what most people agree should be done is tremendously
important (cf. Larson and Ribot, 2004). This is a matter of
process legitimacy, and social legitimacy, and the analysis put
forward supports the argument that both rollouts fall short on
these fronts (also see Jegen and Philion, 2017). They are char-
acterised by scalar biases that reduce the role of households as
smart meter users to responsibilised recipients of socio-technical
interventions, whose behaviour and everyday use of electric grids
has to fall in line with decisions made at the national scale. The
actual manner of deployment and what the socio-technical
energy infrastructure should do and actually does are treated as
technical matters for experts at hierarchies above household
scales.
In practice, this reduces uncertainty and makes the socio-
material advent of automation in energy transitions a largely
technical matter that falls within a stable social imaginary of what
energy infrastructure should do within what our current energy
system looks like (Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019). Rollout that
privileges the scalar biases of technical decision-making at
national scales neither enables a deliberative consensus-building
process across multiple scales (Britton, 2019), nor recognises the
socio-technical complexities and possibilities inherent in intro-
ducing infrastructure like smart meters (Sareen and Haarstad,
2018). It simply goes ahead with implementing a pre-defined
vision that is determined by the understanding and interests of
experts up the hierarchy of bureaucratic energy sectors. The
Norwegian case shows that this can proceed relatively smoothly
and effectively through early government–industry coordination;
the Portuguese example shows that while lack of clarity can slow
things down, it can be dealt with among technical and political
experts, and resolved without bringing in greater user perspectives.
The challenging option, rich with uncertainties and possibi-
lities, is one that requires an appetite for and genuine interest in
the ways people think, feel and interact with energy infrastructure
(Evans et al., 2019). But decision-makers at the national scale
operate under constrained conditions. They require an excep-
tional outlook to perceive the value of reflexive policy processes,
and great political will to cultivate them over time (Becker et al., 2016;
Broto and Baker, 2018). The evidence from how energy transi-
tions have fared so far suggests poor chances of such attitudes and
efforts pushing towards user-centric automation that provides
greater control to the household scale or even urban adminis-
trators (cf. Britton, 2019)—smart meter rollout as the emerging
first layer to enable advanced socio-technical automation is no
exception.
Creating space for deliberation—expending political capital to
argue for more measured, painstaking approaches—is an essential
component of efforts to overcome the uneven scalar effects of
socio-technical interventions (Evans et al., 2019; Raven et al.,
2012). Yet, consensus orchestrated among a few key players by
offering everyone who already has a seat at the table something to
satisfy their interests is easier, and often sufficiently convincing to
secure social and process legitimacy in energy sector governance
arrangements (cf. Jegen and Philion, 2017; also see Agrawal and
Ribot, 1999). The study of two contrasting country cases adds
empirical weight to this short-sighted trend. The historical per-
ception of electricity as a largely technical sector allows the
automation of energy infrastructure to proceed in largely tech-
nical and top-down ways precisely because it matches the pre-
valent social imaginary, despite its clear and increasing impact on
everyday social practices.
Data availability
The interviews analysed during this study are not publicly
available due to the sensitive nature of thematic qualitative data
and their use in other outputs as part of two recent and ongoing
projects; however, suitably anonymised notes on specific institu-
tionally attributed interviews are available from the correspond-
ing author on reasonable request.
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